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 To what extent are the structures and contents of the mind innate, and to what 
extent are they learned or otherwise acquired from the environment? Versions of 
this question have shaped theorizing about the mind since the ancient Greeks and 
continue to divide researchers today. The debates concern a wide range of traits—
for example, the capacity for color perception and discrimination, the ability to 
follow a gesture, and even a penchant for surprising people by sneezing in elevators 
( Bouchard et al.  1990 ). Some touch upon matters of great general concern with pos-
sible implications for public policy, such as the nature of IQ, gender preference, and 
criminality. The relevant empirical methodologies are increasingly complex and 
varied: meta-statistical demographics, twin studies, examination of phenotypic 
correlations, study of early childhood development, etc. The debates concern not 
just what is innate, but also the prior questions of what innateness is, whether there 
is just one scientifi cally legitimate conception of innateness, and indeed whether 
this is any at all. Accordingly, we examine below several attempts to articulate a 
conception of innateness that could do some explanatory work (Section 2). We then 
focus on the philosophically salient case of whether  ideas , or  concepts , are innate 
(Section 3). 
 The topic of innateness has a rich history, an understanding of which illumi-
nates the contemporary debates on which we will focus. We thus preface our discus-
sion with some brief historical remarks (Section 1). 
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 1. Historical Background: 
Rationalism and Empiricism 
 The earliest and most famous argument for conceptual innateness occurs in Plato’s 
 Meno , where Socrates purports to demonstrate that a slave boy, who has received no 
explicit instruction, has suffi cient ideas somehow available to him to understand a 
nonobvious proof in Euclidean geometry. Socrates concludes from this demonstra-
tion that the slave boy must be “recollecting” the relevant ideas from a previous in-
carnation. Plato’s student, Aristotle, reacted against this suggestion with what is 
perhaps the fi rst empiricist proposal. On his view,  all ideas are derived from experi-
ence by a causal process in which “forms” (or properties of things) in the external 
world are transmitted into the mind ( Aristotle  1968 , 417–26). With the medieval 
resurgence of interest in Aristotle, the view was defended in highly infl uential writ-
ings of Aquinas (1266/1948, I, 87, a, 3; see  Adams  1975 , 73–74 for discussion), and is 
arguably a chief component of much of what passes today as common sense on the 
topic. 
 In the modern period, John  Locke ( 1690 /1975) also defended a strong form of 
empiricism about concepts, insisting that our simple ideas are derived from sen-
sation, and all other ones are constructed from the simple ones by the mental 
operations of “compounding,” “comparing,” and “abstracting” (Book II, ch. 12). 
Interestingly, he also maintained that our ideas of at least secondary qualities, 
such as color and sound, are  not caused by those very properties in the external 
world (Book II, ch. 8), inviting the suggestion, widely presupposed ever since, that 
at least these elementary perceptual ideas are innate in us (see  Fodor  1981 , 275–77 
for discussion). 
 Full blown nativist proposals resurfaced in the modern period in the work of 
 Herbert of Cherbury ( 1624 /1937), Ralph  Cudworth ( 1678 /1999), and, most famously, 
René  Descartes ( 1647 /1911). Descartes is especially impressed by the fact that the 
geometric fi gures studied by mathematics are not physically possible objects of sen-
sory perception (1641b/1970, 227). Even so basic an idea as that of an  enduring sub-
stance , such as a portion of wax that seems to us to remain constant as it undergoes 
various physical transformations, seems to require an idea of  substance that experi-
ence alone cannot provide ( Descartes  1641a /1970, Meditation 2). 
 Descartes emphasized that the issue concerns not  occurrent , but  dispositional 
properties of a neonate—a point relevant to our discussion below. No one thinks 
that infants are born actually  entertaining the full panoply of geometric ideas that 
might be innately available to them. Rather, innate ideas are like innate character 
traits and diseases, which people “are born with a certain disposition or propensity 
for contracting” (1647/199, 442), and which may require appropriate circumstances 
to be activated (442–43). 
 Following upon Darwin, nativism about “instincts” and other cognitive mecha-
nisms received some support in psychology ( James  1890 /1983, ch. 24) and ethology 
( Lorenz  1957 ; and, for critical discussion,  Lehrman  1953 ,  1970 ). But empiricism 
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became the orthodoxy in at least Anglophone philosophy and psychology until the 
revival of rationalist approaches to the study of language in the work of Noam 
 Chomsky ( 1965 ,  1966 ,  1968 /2006) (see  Chapter  15 ). Advancing what has come to be 
called a “poverty of stimulus” argument, he called attention to the inadequacy of the 
data to which children are standardly exposed to determine the elaborate grammars 
that they quickly, effortlessly, and universally acquire, an observation that cognitive 
scientists have since applied to many other domains, such as the understanding of 
objects, number, animals, artifacts, minds, and morals. (A range of contemporary 
nativist arguments and claims concerning cognition can be found in  Mehler and 
Dupoux ( 1994 ) and  Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich ( 2005 ,  2006 ,  2007 ) .) The revival 
of  conceptual nativism more specifi cally is most associated with the work of Jerry 
Fodor, which we will discuss at length in Section 3. 1 
 2. What is Innateness? 
 But just what is at issue in innateness debates? Might it be, as some claim 
(e.g.,  Griffi ths  1997 ), that we lack any scientifi cally legitimate conception of innate-
ness at all? If so, are innateness debates in fact empty? 
 We can only focus on a few representative views here (see  Mameli and Bateson 
 2006 , for discussion of twenty-seven candidate conceptions of innateness). We 
begin (Section 2.1) with proposals that would subsume the innateness of psycho-
logical traits under a more general positive account of innateness in biological 
terms. We then turn (Section 2.2) to a proposal that focuses on  psychological innate-
ness, characterizing it negatively in terms of how innate psychological traits are  not 
acquired—in particular, not by learning. Finally, we argue (Section 2.3) that, even if 
these proposals fail to suffi ciently articulate scientifi cally legitimate conceptions of 
innateness, this need not undermine innateness debates—in particular, those con-
cerning concepts, the topic of Section 3. 2 
 1 Most contemporary treatments diverge from many of the historical ones in not linking the 
issue of innate ideas to any claims of  a priori knowledge, or knowledge justifi able independently 
of experience. It is now widely presumed there could be plenty of innate beliefs that are false (e.g., 
that space is Euclidean). Cf.  Hart ( 1975 ). 
 2 Our concern is not with the meaning of the vernacular term  innate , or with folk 
conceptions of innateness. The question is what innateness may be, and what may be innate, 
from the perspective of our best current scientifi c theorizing. We nonetheless mark proposals’ 
counterintuitive consequences. For, with suffi ciently signifi cant departures (for example, if what is 
learned were allowed to be innate), one may wonder whether we retain a conception of  innateness 
at all—or at least whether it is advisable to retain the  word “innate.” 
 Griffi ths  (2002) suggests a distinct reason for avoiding the word. He maintains that the 
vernacular conception of innateness is an expression of a largely unrefl ective and automatic 
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 2.1. Biological Conceptions 
 In the light of modern biology, it is natural to interpret nativism in terms of the 
contribution genes make to a trait’s emergence. But a satisfactory formulation of 
this idea has proven elusive. Approaches that emphasize causal determination face 
the problem that prima facie practically all traits (among them innate traits) result 
from the  interaction of genes and environment (that is, anything not part of the 
genome). Even the emergence of so seemingly paradigmatic an innate trait as eye 
color depends upon intricate genetic-environmental interactions. Moreover, it is 
unclear how to apportion causal responsibility. As  Sober ( 1988 ) emphasizes, there is 
no “common currency” (312) with which to compare the relative contributions of 
genes and environment; unlike physical forces, biological determinants do not in 
general decompose into amounts of genetic versus nongenetic “force.” Some other 
approach would be needed to identify when the genetic contribution is appropri-
ately “critical” in a way that can underwrite a claim of innateness (cf.  Waters  2007 ). 
 It might be thought that technical notions of  heritability employed in popula-
tion genetics might be of use here, where the genetic heritability of a trait within a 
population is  the proportion of phenotypic variation due to genetic variation . But the 
heritability of a trait is not even defi ned for populations in which there is  no 
 variation—as with, for many populations, the intuitively innate trait of  having a 
head . Moreover, intuitively innate traits—such as having fi ve fi ngers—can exhibit 
low heritability: the majority of people lacking fi ve fi ngers may be victims of acci-
dents. 3 Another strategy would borrow ideas employed more generally in attempts 
to naturalize content (see Section 3.4.1 below) to cash out genetic determination in 
terms of a trait’s being “coded” for in the genes. But scaling up such suggestions 
beyond the representation of amino acid triplets and proteins remains problematic 
( Godfrey-Smith  2007 ). 
 Alternatively, one might avoid the problem by rejecting the claim that  innate 
traits result from the interaction of genes and environment—more specifi cally, by 
identifying innate traits with the properties of the genotype itself. If one does not 
require that such traits be characterized in molecular or non-relational terms, this 
identifi cation can be less restrictive than it might appear at fi rst, for it then can 
 include dispositional properties, such as the disposition to have concept C activated 
folk-biological essentialism that “acts as a sink . . .draw[ing] new, stipulative usages back towards 
the established use” which, confounding empirically dissociable properties, encourages illicit 
inferences. (Folk biology is itself signifi cantly innate according to some, though not Griffi ths. Cf. 
 Medin and Atran  1999. ) For some initial empirical investigation into the vernacular conception of 
innateness, see  Griffi ths et al. (2009) . Note that, where they and others speak of concepts, we speak 
of  conceptions so as to avoid prejudging whether elements of a conception are constituents of a 
concept—cf. Samuels (2007). For a pragmatic argument against eliminating either the term  innate 
or the concept of innateness from scientifi c discussion, see Cowie (2009). 
 3 The confl ation of genetic heritability, genetic determination, and innateness has muddied 
public debate concerning IQ in particular. Cf.  Lewontin ( 1974 ),  Block ( 1995 ), and  Sober ( 2001 ). For 
a discussion of  non genetic heritability, see  Mameli ( 2004 ). 
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in appropriate circumstances (see Section 3). The restriction, however, precludes 
the possibility of innate traits that emerge in development: for example, having a 
head or secondary sexual characteristics (including their psychological aspects), as 
opposed to the disposition to develop such traits. 
 Some of these suggestions are worthy of further exploration. But for the re-
mainder of this section we concentrate on two versions of another approach. These 
grant the indispensability of environmental contributions to the acquisition of 
innate traits, but emphasize the irrelevance of environmental variation. 
 2.1.1. Invariance 
 Sober formulates his “Invariance” conception of innateness as follows:
 (INV) a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if and only if that pheno-
type will emerge in all of a range of developmental environments. 
(1988, 795). 4 
 Such traits are said to have a “fl at norm of reaction” for the genotype: plotting the 
trait as a function of the relevant environments yields a fl at line. Invariance is easily 
confused with species universality. But where the former asks what  one genotype 
would yield in varying environments, the latter asks what  various related genotypes 
have in fact yielded in actual environments. 
 (INV) faces two major challenges: (i) to specify the relevant range of environ-
ments (a recurring problem, as we will see), and (ii) to accommodate invariance 
apparently owed to environmental stability. A third, more theory-laden challenge 
would be to accommodate innate traits that are not invariant because they are only 
present when triggered (see Section 2.2.2). 
 The basis of the fi rst challenge is obvious enough: absent some restriction on 
the relevant range of environments—for example, to exclude conditions of extreme 
deprivation or radical intervention—practically no trait is innate according to 
(INV). But it is not an easy task to provide a specifi cation with an independent sci-
entifi c basis. 
 If we restrict the range to environments that are or have been statistically typi-
cal, we face the problem that many genotypes are tokened but once (note that a 
whole individual’s genome tokens a specifi c genotype): their actual environment is 
thus their typical environment, rendering all their traits innate. If we advert to what 
is or has been typical for their species, there is the problem that environments 
 intuitively extreme for one morph might be typical for another. 5 Appealing to the 
 4 Cf., for example,  Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett ( 2005 , 323, fn. 7): “What we mean [by an 
innate trait] is that it reliably develops across the species’ normal range of environments.” Also, 
 Goldin-Meadow ( 2003 , 215): an innate trait is something “whose development is, if not inevitable, 
certainly one that each organism in the species is predisposed to develop in widely varying 
circumstances”—though note our remark below on species universality. 
 5 The formulation “what is or has been” includes proposals that advert to what evolutionary 
psychologists call the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness. Cf.  Tooby and Cosmides ( 1990 ). 
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typical environment of some smaller set of genotypes would not address the further 
problem that some intuitively innate traits in fact emerge in very few environments: 
most spiders fail to reach adulthood. Conversely, the occurrence of certain statisti-
cally rare environments seems to render some traits  non -innate: bees differentiate 
into workers and queens depending on what they are fed in the larval stage, but very 
few bees are exposed to a queen’s ration. We might instead try restricting the range 
to what is “normal” in some nonstatistical sense, but this only heightens the demand 
for an independent scientifi c basis for this restriction—an issue to which we return 
in Section 2.2. 
 Sober ( 1998 ) suggests that there might not be a single specifi cation of relevant 
environments: one might need to fi x the range “pragmatically” (795), presumably as 
it varies with (scientifi cally legitimate) explanatory interests—different interests 
picking out different ranges of environments, much as different interests might pick 
different ranges of circumstances to identify something as a solvent or a poison. If 
different interests could be in play on different occasions regarding one and the 
same trait, then innateness would be a relative property—or, alternatively, the term 
 innate would express different properties in different contexts. 
 The second challenge is that, on any reasonable restriction of the environmen-
tal range, there seem to be intuitively non-innate invariant traits. Consider a per-
son’s belief that she has a nose. This belief is presumably learned and so not innate. 
But arguably this belief would have emerged in any of the environments relevant to 
(INV) (cf.  Stich  1975b , 9; and  Wendler  1996 , 92–94). Sober’s pragmatic reply to the 
fi rst challenge seems only to heighten the diffi culties here, since practically any trait 
will be innate at least relative to some range if there is some explanatory interest that 
has us hold it fi xed (suppose we want to know why not everyone who learns grade 
school math can master the calculus). 
 A standard diagnosis of this diffi culty is that (INV) fails to place proper con-
straints on the process by which a trait is acquired. It asks only whether it always 
 would be acquired without distinguishing the roles of endogenous and exogenous 
contributions. But it is unclear how best to remedy this lack.  Mallon and Weinberg 
( 2006 ) add a requirement that the process be “closed” in the sense of normally lead-
ing to one outcome. But some learning-like processes are closed in this sense—for 
example, some forms of imprinting, as when some species of parasite normally 
imprints on a particular type of host ( Mameli  2004 discusses some cases, albeit for 
a different purpose). An alternative attempt, to which we now turn, is  Ariew’s ( 1996 , 
 1999 ,  2007 ) “Canalization” proposal. 
 2.1.2. Canalization 
 The term  canalization was coined by the biologist C.H.  Waddington ( 1957 ,  1975 ) to 
refer to a trait’s relative insensitivity to genetic and environmental perturbations. 
The label comes from his comparison of an organism’s development to a ball rolling 
down a grooved landscape. The grooves (or canals) represent the organism’s geneti-
cally determined developmental possibilities. A trait is genetically well-canalized to 
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the extent that genetic variation would not affect the canals that channel develop-
ment in its direction. We can extend the metaphor to capture  environmental canali-
zation by allowing the landscape’s topography to be determined in part by 
environmental factors as well. A trait then is environmentally well-canalized to the 
extent that changes to the  environment would not affect the canals that channel 
development in its direction. Ariew proposes that we deploy Waddington’s notion 
of environmental canalization to characterize innateness:
 (CAN) A trait is innate for a genotype to the degree to which its development is 
“insensitive to a range of environmental conditions.” ( Ariew  1999 , 128) 
 The crucial difference between this proposal and (INV) is the appeal to “insensitiv-
ity.” But how is this to be understood? It would not suffi ce to let talk of insensitivity 
simply mark the relevant difference between endogenous and exogenous invari-
ance: the question in the fi rst place was whether there is a scientifi cally legitimate 
way of articulating this distinction. Moreover,  Ariew ( 1999 , 123–26) follows Sober in 
emphasizing that there is no factoring out the comparative causal contributions of 
genes and the environment. At least in this sense, practically all traits are sensitive to 
both sorts of factors without one kind of factor intelligibly playing a larger or more 
signifi cant role than the other. 6 If there is some other relevant sense of sensitivity, it 
must be supplied. 
 Some alternative attempts to cash out “insensitivity” come at a cost. Suppose, 
for example, that a trait’s development is insensitive to the environment if it not 
only invariantly emerges, but moreover emerges in an invariant way—suggested 
perhaps by Collins’s (2005, 167) discussion of “developmental implasticity.” So con-
strued, (CAN) clearly differs from (INV): if various developmental pathways can 
lead to one’s believing one has a nose, then according to (CAN) it is not innate. But 
it is unclear why intuitively innate traits must have invariant developmental path-
ways (however such pathways are individuated). Many genotypes exhibit genetic 
redundancy: some other gene or genetic pathway can compensate for the inactiva-
tion of a gene otherwise central to the development of a trait. Waddington’s epige-
netic landscape in such cases would contain multiple branching canals that at some 
point fl ow back together toward their shared phenotypic goal. Why should the 
 existence of “backup” developmental pathways preclude innateness? Similarly, if the 
backup involves learning: why should the  possibility of acquiring a trait through 
learning undermine the innateness of a trait that as it happens is not learned? Con-
sider the species of canary  Ariew ( 2007 , 572) mentions elsewhere that can acquire its 
song either through learning or hormonal triggering. 
 These problems suggest another reading of (CAN), albeit one disavowed in 
 Ariew ( 2007 ). Perhaps so far as innateness is concerned, what is crucial to how a 
trait develops is not that it develop in just one way, but that the developmental 
 6 Mechanisms that arguably have evolved specifi cally to “buffer” a developmental pathway 
against environmental perturbations (see below) can work precisely because they  are sensitive to 
the environment in this sense. 
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 pathway that is in fact followed be  of the right kind . In particular, it must involve a 
mechanism that evolved (or was co-opted) to have the function of “buffering” de-
velopment against certain environmental contingencies. But here too we face sev-
eral problems. First, we are forced to count genetic disorders as non-innate. Second, 
we are forced to count traits as non-innate if their presence is explained, not by the 
functions of evolved mechanisms, but by developmental or lower-level physical 
constraints, as in  Cherniak ( 2005 ) on optimal neural wiring, and  Chomsky ( 2005 , 
 2007 ) on computational effi ciency. 7 Finally, it is unclear that (CAN) so construed 
rules out learned traits: a trait could be canalized to be learned or otherwise ac-
quired from experience. As  Mameli and Bateson ( 2006 , 172) point out,  Sterelny 
( 2003 ) argues that our folk biological ability to taxonomize animals is canalized in 
the current sense but is nevertheless in part culturally acquired. 
 This last worry recalls the objection to Invariance based on intuitively non-
innate but invariantly acquired traits—for example, invariantly learned beliefs. 
Ariew’s (2007) reply to such cases involves adducing environments in which the 
relevant environmental factors are absent. But these environments are arguably 
abnormal, and intuitively innate traits can be rendered non-innate in the same 
way: since both innate and invariant but non-innate traits have developmental 
pathways that would be disrupted in certain environments, a basis is needed for 
treating cases differently. 
 Ariew’s response (2007—but see also 1999) is that what matters for innateness 
is whether a trait’s emergence is sensitive to  certain specifi c kinds of environmental 
factors, where the relevant factors can vary with the trait in question and indeed 
with one’s explanatory interest. It is this that should fi x the relevant range of envi-
ronmental variation. Thus,  some birdsong is innate because its emergence does not 
depend on song-like acoustic cues, and the Language Acquisition Device is innate 
insofar as its emergence does not depend on linguistic input—even if, as Ariew 
emphasizes, both depend on environmental contributions for emergence at all. 8 
The belief that one has a nose, however,  is dependent on particular sorts of experi-
ence relevant for assessing its innateness; so it is legitimate to consider an environ-
mental range lacking such experiences—even if in some cases the environment is 
only “conceptually possible” (2007, 577). What gives content to Ariew’s account then 
is not the particular contribution genes make—despite occasional remarks such as 
that a canalized trait is one whose development is under “strict genetic control” 
(1999, 134). Rather, it is a sense of what kinds of environmental contributions to 
disallow in particular cases—one presumably based on the explanatory success of 
particular developmental models and strategies. (See  Griffi ths  2009 , section 5, 
 7 It is not even clear whether  genetic canalization is the result of selection pressures as 
opposed to, for example, genetic-developmental constraints. See  Siegal and Bergman ( 2002 ) and 
 Wilkin ( 2003 ). 
 8 Ariew simplifi es his examples in order to illustrate the idea. For example, the innate birdsong 
to which he refers remains highly schematic, although recognizably similar, in comparison to the 
normal song of conspecifi cs who have received the relevant cues; see  Gould and Marler ( 1991 ). 
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 however, for skepticism that research in developmental biology, including on bird-
song, in fact vindicates the usefulness of such a conception of innateness.) 
 Arguably, Ariew’s view mainly differs from Sober’s in that it says more about 
the basis for pragmatically varying the relevant environmental range. Cashed out in 
terms of the exclusion of  specifi c environmental factors, canalization also bears a 
close relation to the next conception we examine. 
 2.2. Psychological Primitivism 
 Fiona  Cowie ( 1999 ) and Richard  Samuels ( 1998 ,  2002 ,  2004 ) develop a conception 
of innateness that, like Ariew’s, is designed to improve upon (INV) by factoring in 
the way an organism comes to possess a trait. There is a surface difference in that 
Ariew presents his characterization of innate traits positively in terms of how they 
 are acquired (via a canalized developmental pathway), while Cowie and Samuels’s 
Primitivism characterizes them negatively in terms of how they are  not acquired. 
This difference vanishes, however, if canalization must be cashed out in turn by 
reference to excluded environmental interactions. Primitivism then differs fi rst and 
foremost in that it is restricted to a particular domain and that it locates its exclu-
sion of particular environmental interactions at a disciplinary boundary. Thus  Segal 
( 2007 ) suggests that the two strategies simply refl ect two sides of the same phenom-
enon, at least so far as psychological traits are concerned (more on this below). 
 Specifi cally, Primitivism builds on the thought that innate traits are not  learned . 
Of course, not being learned, even if necessary for innateness, intuitively does not 
suffi ce—consider sunburns. But the suggestion is that, suitably refi ned, it might 
suffi ce for the innateness of  psychological traits. The idea is that, however such traits 
are acquired, so long as they are not acquired via a psychological process, psycholo-
gists can treat them as primitives so far as their own theorizing goes—and this is 
what is at issue at least in (many) innateness debates in the cognitive sciences. 
 Cowie’s concern—so far as primitivism as a conception of innateness goes—is 
to distinguish it from other conceptions and to identify a tradition based upon it 
that connects early modern debates with Fodor’s work. Her critical discussion con-
centrates more on Fodor’s claims concerning  what is innate, so understood. 
 Samuels’s discussion, on the other hand, spends more time worrying whether this 
conception is itself scientifi cally viable; for that reason, we focus here on his devel-
opment of the position (aspects of Cowie’s critical discussion come up in Section 3 
below). 
 2.2.1. Primitivism and Overgeneration 
 Samuels’s initial statement of primitivism is as follows:
 (PRIM) . . . a psychological structure is innate [for a genotype] just in case it is a 
psychological primitive. . . . [i.e.,] a structure posited by some correct scientifi c 
psychological theory [but such that] no correct scientifi c psychological 
theory . . . explains [its] acquisition . . . (2002, 246) 
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 What counts as a correct scientifi c psychological explanation of acquisition— 
Samuels’s potentially less restrictive substitute for “learning”—is for science to say. 
But Samuels mentions explanations that advert to perception, inference, or condi-
tioning. Nonpsychological explanations would include neurobiological and mo-
lecular biological explanations that do not advert to such processes. It would include 
as well “brute-causal” triggering by external factors, including triggering that fol-
lows upon experiential input, a case particularly important for discussions of con-
cept acquisition (see Section 3.1.2). The distinction is no doubt unclear: for example, 
it is unclear what subpersonal computations count as inferential. But perhaps it is a 
virtue of the view that it refl ects the crux of many fi rst-order debates about psycho-
logical innateness, and thus locates what future research must clarify if this concep-
tion of innateness is to prove legitimate. 9 
 Samuels worries, however, that his account overgenerates, admitting intuitively 
non-innate psychological traits whose acquisition is not explained psychologically. 
Head trauma, stroke, or surgery, for example, can cause brain lesions with a variety 
of psychological consequences (e.g., altered personality, memory, problem-solving 
capacities, etc.). In one well-known case, the mind of Phineas Gage, a nineteenth 
century railway worker, was dramatically transformed by an iron rod that passed 
through his frontal lobes after he accidentally tamped it into fused gunpowder 
( Damasio  1994 ). With good reason, Gage’s friends reported that he was no longer 
the man he was, not that his innate self had been triggered. 
 A possible reply is that closer examination would reveal a psychological compo-
nent to such cases. The thought is not that a psychological process might intervene 
between neural cell death and psychological end state (though that might indeed 
cover some cases). Rather, it might be that Gage, for example, wound up as he did in 
part because of earlier psychological acquisition processes: arguably, his psychological 
end state resulted from that sort of cell death occurring in  that sort of mind/brain. 
 This reply has the prima facie virtue of potentially helping as well with at least 
some of a wide range of more mundane cases that Samuels does not discuss. Per-
ceptual states seem to brute-causally yield non-innate psychological states in a vari-
ety of ways: consider the emotional effects of music or a warm bath, or the experience 
of “love at fi rst sight.” Learned associations might provide a reply in some cases. A 
broader list of psychological acquisition processes might cover others—so long, of 
course, as the processes were reasonably distinguished from brute-causal triggering. 
But, for some, one might need to invoke earlier psychological acquisition processes 
that prepared the way for the mundane cases at issue . 
 On the other hand, the reply raises delicate questions of individuation: just 
what should be included in a trait’s acquisition process? Gage would not have 
 9 Cf., for example,  Carey ( 2009 , 453): 
 “Innate” simply means unlearned—not the output of an associative process, a 
hypothesis testing mechanism, or a bootstrapping process—that is, not the output of 
any process that treats information derived from the world as evidence. 
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 acquired those traits in the way he did had he not learned how to set a fuse in gun-
powder. But presumably his having learned  that does not suffi ce to render the 
acquisition process psychological. Note also that our more mundane cases all in-
volve perception, explicitly deemed a psychological acquisition process by Samu-
els. So, one is tempted to count the emotion’s acquisition process psychological as 
well by including the perceptual process as a part. But what would warrant doing 
so in such cases, but not in cases involving perceptual triggering? (See also the dis-
cussion in Section 3.4.2 below concerning the role learning a stereotype may play 
in concept acquisition.) 
 2.2.2. Normal Development 
 In any event, Samuels pursues a different reply to the overgeneration problem. He 
maintains that the cases that worry him—rods through heads, strokes, and presum-
ably at least some forms of medical intervention—are clear instances of abnormal 
development, so he adds to (PRIM) a normalcy clause that would exclude them:
 (PRIM*) A psychological structure is innate for a genotype just in case it is a 
 psychological primitive and would be “acquire[d] . . . in the normal course of 
events.” (2002, 259) 
 Of course, the added clause does not address our mundane, clearly not abnormal 
cases—nor is it intended to—so they would have to be handled some other way, 
perhaps as above. 
 (PRIM*) might be read as requiring either (i) that the trait not be acquired 
abnormally (i.e., that it would emerge in  a normal course of events) or (ii) that it 
would emerge in  all normal courses of events (so that Samuels’s view becomes a 
combination of unrefi ned Primitivism and Invariance restricted to normal envi-
ronments). Questions concerning triggering arise either way. 
 The fi rst reading has problems with some nonpsychological modes of acquisi-
tion capable of yielding different psychological traits in different normal environ-
ments. Clear cases are diffi cult to supply in the absence of empirical details, but the 
conceptual point is clear enough. Suppose that, along lines of Chomskyan linguis-
tics, the specifi c grammatical rules a speaker respects are determined by the setting 
of certain “parameters,” such as whether verbs precede or follow their objects (an 
“SVO” versus an “SOV” language), and these parameters are triggered by certain 
stimuli. Then one’s speaking an SVO language as opposed to an SOV language 
would, implausibly, count as innate. 10 
 The second reading would preclude innate psychological traits that happen to 
be triggered in only  some normal courses of events, as one might hypothesize of, 
 10 The supposition that grammatical parameter setting is a matter of triggering, however, is 
contrary to fact if it involves discerning statistical patterns, and if discerning statistical patterns, 
at least in the way the developing language faculty does, counts as psychological (cf.  Yang  2004 ; 
 Scholz and Pullum  2006 ). 
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say, some mathematical or musical ability. Of course, Samuels may diverge from 
intuition, but on this point, for better or for worse, his view would diverge as well 
from his understanding of Fodor’s conceptual nativism—and Samuels holds that, 
all else being equal, an account of innateness should “preserve the standard catego-
rization of central fi gures” (2002, 239). On Samuels’s understanding of Fodor, con-
cepts are innate because they are acquired by triggering. But such triggering need 
not invariantly occur: indeed, Samuels raises just this as a further objection to 
 Sober’s Invariance proposal. This divergence from Fodor is avoided, however, if the 
triggering is rather understood as only activating a concept already possessed—cf. 
Section 3. 11 
 In addition, further refi nement would be needed to accommodate traits that 
can be acquired in multiple ways, as discussed in Section 2.1.2. (PRIM*), for  example, 
would not exclude abnormally acquired psychologically primitive traits that  would 
have been acquired psychologically in some or all normal environment(s). This 
complication can be avoided by dropping Samuels’s modal language: we might 
simply require that the primitive not  in fact be acquired abnormally. But if there 
are triggered, non-innate psychological traits (the SOV example), then again we 
would need to consider as well what would emerge in other normal environments, 
 contrary—as we just saw—to what can be allowed by conceptions that admit non- 
invariantly acquired innate traits. 12 
 On either reading, if (PRIM*) is to articulate a scientifi cally legitimate concep-
tion of innateness, it is important that its notion of normalcy be neither evalua-
tive—based on some conception of how we ought, or are supposed, to be—nor 
merely refl ect a “folk” conception of our proper environments or course of develop-
ment. 13 But there is room to question whether a scientifi cally legitimate alternative 
is available. We have already mentioned reasons for not adverting to what is statisti-
cally typical. Nor does a functional conception, invoking environments in which an 
 11  Fodor ( 1998 ) later retreats from a commitment to concept nativism—see Section 
3.4.2—allowing that concepts can fail to be learned but not thereby be innate, even in normal 
cases. Samuels’s divergence from Fodor on  this score might be mitigated by allowing for a 
relativization of innateness to specifi c developmental systems (discussed below): the concepts 
could be primitive for psychology, but not relative to some other developmental system of which 
they are the outcome. 
 12 If there are innate genetic psychological disorders (perhaps autism), then their actual 
course of development must count as normal in the sense used here. This might sound 
counterintuitive, but perhaps only if one confl ates a notion of genetic abnormality with what 
environments are normal for the genotype. That said, it may be unclear what should count as 
normal for an abnormal genotype. 
 13 The evaluative sense is of course important and (we hope) guides our attempts to  improve 
our environments—medically and otherwise. But this does not suffi ce for it to scientifi cally 
legitimate Samuels’s conception of innateness. Consider Phenylketonuria (PKU), a genetic disorder 
that leads to mental retardation unless both the mother when pregnant and the child afterwards 
adhere to a severely restricted diet (cf.  Kitcher  1996 ). If only “restricted diet” environments count as 
normal, then, according to (PRIM*), PKU-mental retardation is not innate and its absence is; if both 
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organism lives and thrives, seem to help. The natural nonevaluative explication 
would be in terms of fi tness—so that normal environments were ones, roughly, that 
led to more offspring. But medical intervention (e.g., personality-altering brain 
surgery) can increase fi tness. 
 Samuels does not expand on the notion of normalcy. In defense, he notes that 
 ceteris paribus clauses that assume “some largely unarticulated set of normal con-
ditions” (2004, 140) are a common feature of all sciences with the possible excep-
tion of physics, so that an appeal to normalcy in this case raises no special problems. 
Indeed, such an appeal may not be to any specifi c set of normal conditions so 
much as an exclusion of apparent exceptions to a law as due to independent inter-
ference (cf.  Pietroski and Rey  1995 ; and, for general discussion of  ceteris paribus 
laws,  Earman, Glymour, and Mitchell  2003 ). But even if such a notion raises no 
special philosophical problems, it does not follow that it is empirically legitimate 
in this case . Like his psychological/non-psychological distinction, Samuels’s nor-
malcy clause places an empirical bet: that science will indeed fi nd it fruitful to 
consider all of those developmental factors abnormal interferences. It is clear 
enough that we often have an interest in how the occurrence or absence of an ac-
cident, surgery, or stroke would affect outcomes. But then we are also interested in 
how the occurrence or absence of various dietary, genetic, educational factors, etc. 
would affect outcomes. What is not clear is that there is an independent  scientifi c 
reason for deeming the former abnormal. It is perhaps noteworthy that, again, 
developmental biologists are arguably among the most skeptical that there exists a 
scientifi cally useful notion of innateness (cf.  Griffi ths and Gray  1994 ;  Oyama  2000 ; 
 Johnson  1997 ;  Bateson  2000 ). 
 2.2.3. Generalizing Primitiveness 
 Psychological Primitivism expressly limits its ambitions. Some might consider this 
a liability, others, a positive asset. In any event, it is worth noting, fi rst, that nothing 
in Primitivism precludes the possibility of other scientifi cally legitimate concep-
tions of innateness. It is, for example, in principle consistent with any of a variety of 
biological conceptions (we return to Canalization in particular presently). But 
restricted and unrestricted diets count, then neither presence nor absence is innate on reading one 
above, but both are on reading two; if only unrestricted diets count (what until recently would 
have been typical, perhaps universal), then PKU-mental retardation is innate but not its absence. It 
is clear what environments we want, but not clear what environments are abnormal in a (nonsta-
tistical) scientifi cally useful sense. Similarly for other environmental alterations and innovations 
it is “normal” for us cultural creatures to introduce: clothing, improved diets, correction of vision, 
dental care, types of ornamentation, etc.—many of which have psychological consequences. 
 Regarding folk conceptions, note that  Griffi ths  (2002) and  Griffi ths et al. (2009) maintain 
that the vernacular conception of innateness includes a nonscientifi c notion of  intended outcome : 
“how the organism is  meant to develop [so that] to lack the innate trait is to be malformed [and] 
environments that disrupt this trait are themselves abnormal.” (2009, 609) 
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Primitivism does not require this: it could capture what is at stake in innateness 
debates concerning  psychological traits even if biological innateness proved a chi-
mera. It is also possible that biological innateness (assuming it is not a chimera) and 
psychological innateness as the primitivist conceives it could diverge—for instance, 
if an unlearned psychological trait were deemed biologically non-innate owing to 
the particular role of environmental factors such as diet (such considerations get 
raised in debates concerning, e.g., IQ and autism). Of course, the possibility of mul-
tiple legitimate innateness conceptions poses no problem apart from the risk of 
terminological confusion (cf.  Cracraft  2000 on different conceptions of “species”). 
 Second, the primitivist strategy might generalize, so one could view  Psychologi-
cal Primitivism as an instance of a more general template for generating distinct 
innateness conceptions. Psychological Primitivism isolates  psychological traits and 
identifi es those that are innate based on the absence in their normal acquisition of 
certain processes proprietary to the psychological: processes that involve proprie-
tary interactions with, or input from, the environment. One might  mutatis mutan-
dis likewise identify innate traits in other domains. In famous work for which he 
received a Nobel Prize, Niels  Jerne ( 1985 ) postulated that all the antibodies people 
ever develop in reaction to disease are already available prior to exposure, waiting to 
be activated by a pathogen. Whatever else might be true of their acquisition, such 
antibodies can be said to be innate in the sense that their acquisition does not re-
quire a process of exposure: they are primitives for the immune system. Other ap-
plications of the template—to language, concepts, the digestive system, or what 
have you—would be justifi ed to the extent they cohered with successful scientifi c 
theorizing that posited primitives within a domain (including possibly, as the ex-
amples suggest, distinct applications to  sub domains of the psychological). 
 We might alternatively characterize these primitives as what constitute the ex-
planatorily relevant, normal  initial state of some system of the organism. Such states 
need not be  temporally initial: there could be elements that arise after a system’s 
operations are engaged, but not  by those operations, and then go on to serve as 
primitives for further operations. These elements could even be acquired as a result 
of a process that, while not part of the system, involves acquired elements of the 
system (again, we will return to the idea of acquired concepts triggered by learned 
stereotypes in Section 3.4.2 below). In the limiting case, the initial state would be the 
genotype itself (see above). But one need not suppose that the explanatorily inter-
esting initial state for each such system—and thus what counts as innate for the 
system—is the same in each case or cannot include effects of the environment. In 
particular, on this view, the possibility arises again of one and the same trait being 
innate (primitive, initial) for one domain or system but not for another. It might be 
required, however, that no matter the domain or system, its initial state should not 
be itself acquired via learning, on pain of loosing contact with our pre-theoretic 
conceptions of innateness altogether. Such talk of domains, initial states, and pro-
prietary processes (and their proprietary inputs) begs for clarifi cation. But arguably 
they carry their weight to the extent that successful explanatory strategies fi nd them 
useful. 
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 Have we thus been led back to Canalization as cashed out negatively in terms of 
precluded environmental interaction? Recall the belief that one has a nose. (PRIM*) 
excludes this trait by dint of the process by which it is acquired in normal environ-
ments. (CAN) excludes it because it is not invariantly possessed in all  relevant envi-
ronments, where the nature of the trait and our explanatory project dictate that 
environments lacking experience necessary for acquiring this trait be deemed rele-
vant (even if only conceptually possible). The basis for exclusion is thus differently 
characterized. But presumably, in the application of (CAN), the experience- defi cient 
environment is deemed relevant precisely because such traits normally depend on 
acquiring the belief based on such experience; this is similar for other cases. What 
underwrites innateness for both (CAN) and generalized (PRIM*) thus appears to 
be the same: strategies that succeed at explaining the development of systems from 
their initial states by identifying proprietary environment-involving processes. Ar-
guably, however, the nontemporal notion of initial state derived from Primitivism 
differs from the more naturally temporal notion common to the developmental 
biological models that inspire Canalization. 
 2.3. Suppose We Do Not Know What Innateness Is 
 We have discussed several conceptions of innateness, suggesting indeed that they 
may not differ as much as it can seem at fi rst glance. But suppose that upon even 
closer inspection none of them pan out, so that we do not currently possess an ex-
planatorily useful conception of innateness. Would this render the concept, and 
debates involving it, empty or unintelligible? Not necessarily. 
 First, it is a common semantic externalist claim about natural kind concepts 
that possessing them is compatible with holding many false beliefs concerning the 
kind—and indeed with possessing practically no conception at all (cf. Section 3.4). 
If this is right, then it is entirely possible that our talk of innateness has suffi ciently 
“locked on” to a real phenomenon  even if we are currently unable to characterize 
that phenomenon satisfactorily, as in the case of ordinary talk of, for example, 
weight, germ, and jade. It is perhaps even possible that we have locked onto multiple 
distinct phenomena in different areas of inquiry. That said, a concept’s explanatory 
utility is reduced to the extent we lack an articulated conception, since a greater 
understanding facilitates the integration of explanations employing the concept 
with other explanations and theories. 14 
 Second, some “innateness” debates could retain their signifi cance  even if there 
is no  phenomenon of innateness that they concern. For example, the idea behind 
 14 Several authors ( Mameli and Bateson  2006 ;  Samuels  2007 ) have recently suggested 
a strategy worth exploring on this front. Instead of searching for informative necessary and 
suffi cient conditions for innateness, one might attempt to uncover empirical correlations among 
properties that serve as evidence for innateness—including among properties that have been 
mistakenly identifi ed, singly or jointly, with innateness. Cf.  Boyd ( 1991 ) on natural kinds and 
homeostatic property clusters. 
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Psychological Primitivism—that innateness debates in psychology concern what is 
learned—retains its interest, even if there is no unifi ed phenomenon of what is  not 
learned. The point is not just that the complement of a natural kind need not itself 
be a natural kind in the way that  mammals , may be, but  nonmammals surely is not. 
Rather, the point is that the complement in this case—the psychological primi-
tives—need not contain any scientifi cally interesting  sub- kind of the innate. What 
really matters is whether a trait is acquired through learning, not whether—if it was 
not learned—the process was in some sense normal or abnormal. 
 We fi nd support for this second point both in the main arguments made on 
behalf of psychological nativism and in the main replies. Consider Chomsky’s “pov-
erty of the stimulus” arguments for our linguistic competence possessing an innate 
component. These arguments stress how children come to possess a linguistic com-
petence that far outstrips the evidence available in their experience, and that conse-
quently that competence could not have been acquired on the basis of that experience 
alone. Replies typically consist in calling attention to further evidence available to 
the child after all, or in arguing that learning strategies can extract from experience 
more information than was realized. It does not matter, so far as such debates are 
concerned, whether the alternative to learning is usefully labeled “innate,” or that 
the label picks out a natural kind (even if it matters to what extent the details of the 
alternative acquisition story can be supplied in a given case). It is enough that there 
is an initial state without which the further perceptual input to the system would be 
inadequate to explain the fi nal stable state of language acquisition that a normal 
human being achieves. 
 This places great weight on the question: what counts as learning? But perhaps 
that is as it should be, at least for some innateness debates. Of course, not all innate-
ness debates can be rescued in this manner, since (as we noted even for psychologi-
cal traits) not all center on learning. If there is no innateness phenomenon but these 
debates are to retain their signifi cance, it will have to be for other reasons. But 
 Psychological Primitivism’s focus on learning suits particularly well the subject of 
our next section—the innateness of concepts. As we will see, much depends on 
what counts as rationally learning a concept versus merely having it triggered con-
sequent to a perceptual process. 
 3. Innate Ideas 
 As mentioned in Section 1, it was nativism regarding  concepts that originally divided 
traditional rationalists such as Leibniz and Descartes, who claimed most of our 
concepts were innate, and empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, who 
claimed they were “derived from experience.” Although Chomsky’s proposals re-
vived Rationalist views generally, Jerry Fodor’s (1975) seminal book,  The Language 
of Thought , revived the specifi c Rationalist views about  conceptual nativism. In 
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 chapter  2 of that book, he proposed the following, radical conceptual nativist 
hypothesis: 15 
 (RCN) To a fi rst approximation, all concepts expressed by single morphemes in 
English are innate. 
 (Morphemes are the smallest linguistic units having meaning; thus “do” and “un-” 
are (mono-)-morphemes—MMs–in English; “undo” is  poly morphemic.) Standard 
estimates of the MMs used by a standard English speaker are between fi fty thousand 
and 250,000 words (see  Bloom  2000 ), and, of course, more serious approximations 
would have to take account of concepts expressed by MMs in one language but not 
in another (e.g., “chic”), or not yet in any. 
 An understandable reaction to (RCN) is to reject it as obviously absurd. Over 
250,000 innate concepts?! But it is not clear what entitles someone to this reaction. 
What does anyone know about precisely what concepts are and how they are ac-
quired; or exactly what “learning” is, and how or whether it should be contrasted 
with being innate? One merit of Fodor’s audacious view is that it calls attention to 
the need to think about these and related issues with a lot more care than has been 
traditionally bestowed. In a useful discussion,  Laurence and Margolis ( 2002 , 26–27) 
call it “Fodor’s Puzzle of Concept Acquisition,” and rightly compare it to puzzles 
about induction raised by Goodman and about translation raised by Quine. For 
these reasons, we will organize the discussion around Fodor’s view, even though in 
the end we will express some sympathy with its critics. We will fi rst set out a number 
of issues that are crucial to the debate (Section 3.1), turning then to the main argu-
ments Fodor presents in his 1975 and 1981 discussions (Section 3.2). Those argu-
ments will lead us to consider the main internalist (Section 3.3) and externalist 
(Section 3.4) views about the nature of concepts, and the role of prototypes as inter-
nal “schemata” relating concepts and percepts. We will conclude (Section 3.5) with a 
brief discussion of  Fodor’s ( 1998 ,  2008 ) latest views, and of the processes of learning 
versus triggering that seem to lie at the heart of the dispute. 
 3.1. Preliminary Issues 
 3.1.1. What Concepts Are 
 We shall presume that concepts are the constituents of the objects of the so-called 
“(propositional) attitudes,” such as  think or  expect . Thus, people who think fi sh 
dream, are thinking the proposition [Fish dream], which they can do only if they 
have the concepts [fi sh] and [dream] (we designate propositions and concepts by 
enclosing in square brackets the words that express them). For simplicity, we shall 
 15 That book was seminal for a number of important views, another being that there is a 
language of thought, which serves as the vehicle of computation in the brain.  Pace  Churchland 
( 1986 , 389), (RCN) is entirely independent of this latter hypothesis. 
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also assume that concepts also serve as the meanings of words, and we will acquiesce 
in Fodor’s treatment of concepts as mental representations. 16 
 A crucial feature that concepts arguably need to possess to be effective con-
stituents of attitudes is what  Fodor ( 1998 ) calls “publicity”: 17 it must be possible 
for different people, and the same person at different times, to have the  same con-
cepts. Someone cannot share a thought with someone else, or even remember a 
thought of her own, unless some of the constituents remain the same across 
people and time. This is a nontrivial requirement, since it is not at all obvious 
which facts about cognitive life are in fact stable across people, whose attitudes 
are constantly changing as they experience and think about the changing world 
around them. On Fodor’s view, concepts are  type representations individuatable 
in part by their content, tokens of which occur in different brains and in the same 
brain at different times. 
 3.1.2. Learning versus Triggering 
 Virtually all parties to the debate agree that experience plays a role in arousing 
whatever innate dispositions people may have to form concepts. But central to the 
debate between Rationalists and Empiricists is the question of just what the charac-
ter of that role may be. Learning as popularly understood can include both rational 
and more brute-causal effects of perceptual experience, and this distinction is cru-
cial to understanding the difference between Rationalists and Empiricists, neither 
of whom want to deny that experience plays  some role in the causation of concep-
tual activity. Empiricists typically want to claim that most of our concepts are in 
some  rational fashion  learned on the basis of experience; Rationalists claim that 
experience merely serves to “occasion” the activation of a concept that a person al-
ready possesses.  Descartes ( 1641b /1970, 227), for example, was especially impressed 
by the fact that the geometric fi gures studied by mathematics are not physically pos-
sible objects of sensory perception, and so thought that the concept [triangle] 
couldn’t possibly be learned from experience. What we see are various irregular 
fi gures that in a context activate, or “occasion,” the concept, causing us to see the 
fi gures  as triangles. In an extreme form, the proposal is sometimes that the activat-
ing stimuli need not be related to the activated representation in any way that is 
rational or relevant in terms of intentional content: all that experience does is to 
provide stimuli that “triggers” the innate conceptual disposition, in the way that, 
say, an innate immune reaction is triggered by exposure to a certain pathogen, a 
reaction that is presumably neither rational nor intentional (see  Jerne  1985 ). As 
 16 Not everyone acquiesces here, but space forbids discussing Peacocke’s (1992), Zalta’s 
(2001) and Rey’s (2005) preferences for treating concepts as more like Frege’s (1892/1966) “senses.” 
See Margolis and Laurence (2007) for discussion. We also abstract from the related issue of 
“nonconceptual” content (see  Crane  1992 ). 
 17 An unfortunate term, suggesting that concepts need be  social , as opposed to “private,” along 
lines claimed by some interpreters of  Wittgenstein ( 1953 , §§ 258ff), a debate entirely orthogonal to 
the present one. A better term for what Fodor has in mind is  stability (see  Rey  1983 ). 
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 Fodor ( 1981 , 304) expresses the Rationalist creed: “Simple concepts which arise as 
the effects of such triggering are, no doubt, learned  in consequence of experience; 
experiences are—directly or indirectly—among their causes. But they aren’t learned 
 from experience.” 18 
 3.1.3. Evolutionary Worries 
 Another common reaction to (RCN) is to worry about how 250,000-plus specifi c 
MM concepts could possibly have evolved. Steven  Pinker ( 2007 ), for example, fi nds 
it “hard to see how an innate grasp of carburetors and trombones could have been 
useful hundreds of thousands of years before they were invented” (95). But here, as 
so often elsewhere, it is crucial to distinguish  evolutionary theory from the specifi c 
mechanism of  natural selection . There is not the slightest doubt that humans evolved 
from earlier primates, but just which traits can be explained by processes of selec-
tion is increasingly controversial (see  Sterelny and Griffi ths  1999 ). Humans display 
abundant capacities (e.g., in music, science, logic, and mathematics) that far exceed 
anything that selection itself plausibly required. 
 Everything depends here upon just how one counts “traits” ( stomach? stomach 
and intestines? stomach and intestines and heart? ), as well as the character of the ge-
netic options available at the time of selection. Thus, bilateral symmetry and the 
structure of bodily organs may refl ect more about the underlying physiochemical 
structures, or “laws of form” ( Thompson  1917 ), than anything about the specifi c 
demands of the selecting environment. 
 Moreover, animals might be evolutionarily prepared in specifi c ways to deal 
with items and states that may not have been present at the time of the evolution. 
To take the example that we have already mentioned, and to which many have 
compared (RCN), Niels Jerne won the Nobel Prize for his work arguing that all 
the antibodies in the immune system are in some sense available innately, waiting 
to be triggered by antigens. Similarly, even concepts of things that were not re-
motely available on the savannah might be innately available: after all, perhaps 
people could only  invent things that counted as carburetors and trombones be-
cause they were innately endowed with the concepts of these things in the fi rst 
place, just as many birds sing only their species’ songs, or spiders weave only cer-
tain kinds of webs. 
 Of course, many will still fi nd an individual innately possessing 250,000-plus 
concepts/songs/dispositions outlandish, and demand that the burden be on the 
conceptual nativist to provide a positive account about how there could be  so 
many , and  such specifi c ones. However, until we have a much deeper understand-
ing of the structure of our minds and how it might be related to underlying 
 18 Fodor’s wording here, “learned in consequence of experience,” seems to imply that he 
thinks concepts are learned after all. We take this to be something of a verbal slip (or issue), the 
crucial distinction remaining whether there is a  rational relation between a concept and the 
experiences that cause it. 
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 genetic structures, it is diffi cult to know how to count these things, and generally 
what constraints selection places on psychological theory. In any case, concep-
tual nativists have presented serious arguments for their view, to which we now 
turn. 
 3.2. Initial Arguments for Conceptual Nativism 
 Poverty of stimulus arguments (see Section 2.3 above) provide one serious argu-
ment for (RCN): experience simply does not seem to supply enough information 
for children to learn the concepts of mathematics, geometry, or enduring sub-
stances, or the host of word meanings that they acquire with astonishing speed and 
uniformity in their fi rst several years (see  Bloom  2000 ). The ur-argument that 
pretty clearly establishes this stimulus poverty is really due to a famous problem 
raised by Chomsky’s teacher, the philosopher Nelson Goodman, regarding the 
concept [grue]. This is an artifi cial concept he devised with the meaning “applies 
to all things examined before  t just in case green but to other things just in case 
they are blue” ( Goodman  1954 /1983, 74). Now, all the emeralds people have so far 
examined have been green, and human beings seem to happily generalize this 
property to emeralds they have not examined, including those that will be exam-
ined only after AD 3000. But all the emeralds they have examined so far have in fact 
also been grue—since, after all, they have been examined before AD 3000. Why do 
not people generalize to  that property instead of green, so that, after AD 3000 they 
would be surprised to fi nd emeralds  green ? All the sensory data we receive at least 
before AD 3000 will not decide the matter. What is worrisome here is that there is 
an  infi nitude of such bizarre concepts (one for each increment of time beyond AD 
3000). Clearly, childhood stimuli are in principle too impoverished to decide be-
tween them. So at least in that respect, at least a sensory concept such as [green] 
can seem to be innate. 19 
 19 There is a vast literature on this “new riddle of induction,” as  Goodman ( 1954 /1983) 
called it (see, e.g.,  Stalker  1994 for a representative collection). It is worth noting that, although 
Goodman himself did not see it as inviting a nativist moral, it is this very problem that was partly 
responsible for the resurgence of interest in conceptual nativism, since  Chomsky ( 1955 /1975, 
33–34; 1971, 6–8) saw his ideas about the innate biases of children to only a specifi c subset 
of possible languages to be simply another (rather more elaborate) instance of Goodman’s 
riddle. Indeed, given that an infi nite number of grue-like concepts can be constructed for  every 
concept we have, it is worth wondering why their existence  alone does not establish that  none 
of the concepts we naturally employ are learned! Fodor, however, though he does draw from 
Goodman’s riddle nativist conclusions concerning the ordering of hypotheses (1975, 39), does not 
directly connect such considerations to conceptual nativism—perhaps because he suspects that 
these unnatural concepts are ruled out by some general considerations that enter into concept 
construction. But the burden would be on the defender of conceptual learning to say what these 
might be. 
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 It is surely no news to empiricists that at least dispositions to sensory percepts 
(e.g. example experiences of green) need to be innate, and so perhaps the concepts 
(e.g. [green]) derived directly from them. After all, the mind cannot really be an 
entirely “blank slate,” lest it not be able to learn anything at all. So it is often con-
ceded that there are, as  Quine ( 1969 ) put it, innate “quality spaces,” biasing a child 
to generalize to [green] rather than [grue], and these would then serve as the basis 
for constructing all the concepts the child acquires. But how does the child do this? 
How does she “construct” new concepts on the basis of experience? This is where 
 Fodor’s ( 1975 ,  1981 ) arguments become germane (we will return to their bearing on 
the “grue” problem in Section 3.5). 
 Fodor’s initial ( 1975 , 79ff;  1981 ) argument for the innateness of concepts was 
quite simple. He pointed out that standard accounts of learning treat it as a process 
of  hypothesis confi rmation : in a classic discrimination experiment, for example, an 
animal learns to respond differently to Rs versus not Rs presumably by confi rming 
an hypothesis along the lines of
 (L) x is R iff x is red and triangular 
 and it does this by keeping track of instances of R that are, and those that are not, 
red triangles. But although this may be a perfectly clear way for the animal to ac-
quire the  belief that (L), it does not seem to be a way to acquire the  concepts of [red] 
and [triangular], or even the conjunction of them: for in order to confi rm (L) the 
animal must already have the means to  entertain it, which it surely cannot do  with-
out already possessing its constituent concepts . At best, a red and triangular stimulus 
could  trigger or  occasion the already available concept [R], not  introduce it. 
 It is important here to distinguish three notions of concept possession that are 
not clearly distinguished in most discussions:
 (i) Having a symbol expressing a certain content that is actually  activated in 
some mental process; 
 (ii) Having a symbol expressing a certain content that has never actually 
been so activated, but is  lying in wait ; 
 and
 (iii) Being able to  express a concept by logical construction on symbols 
expressing certain contents, either already activated or lying in wait. 
 The above argument of Fodor’s (1975) establishes that, if learning is hypothesis 
confi rmation, then an organism cannot learn any concepts whose contents it 
cannot already  express in the sense of (iii). Thus, he allows the obvious point that 
not all concepts are actually  activated . However, if learning is hypothesis testing, 
then it requires, in the very hypothesis, the activation of a concept either already 
activated or lying in wait. In the above example, the organism learning that 
something is R iff it is red and triangular must in that sense already have the 
concept [R]. 
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 This conclusion, however, might only disturb an Aristotelian, who thought that 
expressive power was actually acquired by properties in the world being  transmitted 
to (indeed, being instantiated in!) the mind (cf. Section 1 above). A more modern 
empiricist might argue that what the organism  can learn are syntactically novel 
ways to construct representations of the same conceptual contents it might always 
have been  able to express, which it then sometimes  abbreviates as MM concepts for 
use in memory and thought, as when we “chunk” material for use in short-term 
memory (see  Miller  1956 ). 
 In his (1975) and (1981), Fodor supposes that we can and do learn new  composite 
concepts by logical construction, which seems to suggest that he thinks an organism 
can increase its  expressive power in this way. He seems to suppose, for example, that 
one may well increase one’s repertoire of concepts by thinking “that thing is both 
red and triangular.” (We will see in Section 3.5 that in his (2008) he sees this sup-
position as confused, and rejects even the learning of composite concepts if that 
means increasing expressive power.) All that he is concerned to deny in his (1975) 
and (1981) is that such constructions offer an account of  MM concepts , which he 
thinks are  not acquired by abbreviatory chunking; even when not activated, they 
must be lying in wait. 20 And he thinks this because he fi nds defective all arguments 
and efforts to establish that MM concepts are such abbreviations. Indeed, the cru-
cial part of  Fodor’s ( 1975 ,  1981 ) view is his rejection of the classical empiricist ac-
count of the “analysis” of MM concepts, whose history has in fact not been a happy 
one, and which we now briefl y review. 
 3.3. Internal Constructions 
 3.3.1. The Classical View 
 The Classical View of concepts treated them roughly as representations that are in 
some important way decomposable into conditions that are individually necessary 
and jointly suffi cient for satisfaction of the concept, and are known to any compe-
tent user. The standard example is the especially simple one of [bachelor], which 
seems to be analyzable as [eligible unmarried male]. More interesting ones that 
served as the inspiration of much of “analytic” philosophy were Weierstrauss’s anal-
ysis of the concept of a mathematical limit and Frege’s (1884/1950) analysis of the 
concept of number. 
 20 It is worth bearing in mind that one of Fodor’s (1975) most important intended targets was 
 Piaget ( 1954 ), whom Fodor read as claiming that expressive power could be increased by learning, 
as a child progressed through various cognitive stages. Whether Piaget needs to be read this way 
or could be read as intending only this more modest actual activation view is an issue to which we 
will return in Section 4. 
 Some of Fodor’s own formulations can suggest that triggering involves, or can involve, the 
 acquisition of a concept, not just the  activation of a concept already possessed. Cf. Section 2.2.2 
above. 
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 3.3.2. Empiricism and Verifi cationism 
 The Classical View, however, has always had to face the diffi culty of  primitive con-
cepts in which a process of defi nition must ultimately end. As mentioned earlier, 
seventeenth-century empiricism had a simple solution: all the primitive concepts 
were  sensory . In the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, this was often thought to 
mean that concepts were somehow  composed of introspectible mental items 
(“images,” “impressions”) by  associations among basic sensory parts. Thus,  Hume 
( 1734 /1978) analyzed the concept of [material object] as involving certain regulari-
ties in our sensory experience, and [cause] as involving spatiotemporal contiguity 
and constant conjunction (see Elman et al.  1996 for recent associationist proposals 
along more neurophysiological lines). 
 Mere association, however, is not really adequate to capture the stability of con-
cepts or the roles they play in thought. One person’s sensory associations with [jus-
tice] may differ vastly from another’s without the two people failing to share the 
concept, and few if any such associations (e.g., a blindfolded woman) are candidates 
for the analysis of such an abstract concept. Moreover, after Frege’s work in logic, it 
became clear that any account of how a complex concept might be constructed out 
of sensory ones had to include an account of  logical structure . This is precisely what 
many Logical Positivists attempted to provide. They focused on logically structured 
propositions instead of images and associations, and transformed the empiricist 
claim into the famous Verifi ability Theory of Meaning: the meaning of a proposi-
tion is the means by which it is confi rmed or refuted, ultimately by sensory experi-
ence; the content of a concept is the means by which experiences confi rm or refute 
whether something satisfi es it. The theory gave rise to sustained reductionist pro-
grams, such as those of  phenomenalism (reducing material objects claims to claims 
about sense experience) and  analytical behaviorism (reducing claims about the 
mind to claims about physical behavior). Note that it is no accident that empiricism 
has tended to be the view  both that concepts are verifi cation conditions  and that 
they are acquired from experience, since verifi cation conditions, for empiricists, are 
ultimately sensory tests. 
 Verificationism, however, came under much attack in philosophy in the 
1950s and 1960s. In the first place, few, if any, successful analyses of ordinary 
concepts (like [material object], [expect], [know]) in purely sensory concepts 
have ever been achieved (see, e.g.,  Ayer  1934 for some proposals, and  Quine  1953 
and  Putnam  1962b /1975, for criticisms). And this is not surprising. The relation 
of a concept to the sensory evidence for its application is generally quite com-
plex, and dependent on indefinite numbers of other things being (believed to 
be) in place: someone’s  looking ill confirms their being ill only if (it is believed 
that) the lighting is right, one’s eyes and brain are in working order, and there 
has been no deceptive mischief. Change the background beliefs and one may 
well change the relevant sensory evidence, but without necessarily changing 
the concept (say, of being ill). As  Quine ( 1953 , 41) famously put it, “our beliefs 
 confront the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body” (a view called 
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“ confirmation holism”), which circumstance he saw as undermining any effort 
to supply such analyses, or “analytic” truths, as distinct from ordinary, “syn-
thetic” beliefs about the world. 21 
 Moreover, there is the diffi culty of drawing a principled limit to how deviant 
people can be about the inferences they draw with concepts they seem nonetheless 
entirely competent to use.  Conceptions of a phenomenon may vary wildly while a 
 concept remains the same. Philosophers are notorious for defending outrageous 
claims, for example, that material objects are ideas, that rocks are conscious, or that 
contradictions can be tolerated. Such cognitive states present a serious prima facie 
diffi culty for a theory of concepts that claims their identity or possession involves 
specifi c connections to other concepts or experiences. 
 Perhaps the most important argument for conceptual nativism is one that is 
implicit in  Quine ( 1953 ), but has been increasingly explicit in the work of  Chomsky 
( 1968 /2006), Harman (1964), and Lipton (2004), drawing upon  Peirce ( 1903 /1998, 
287): the role of “ abduction ,” or “inference to the best explanation” in both ordinary 
and scientifi c reasoning. Abduction is a form of nondeductive inference that, unlike 
 induction , may involve the introduction of terms  not in the observational (especially 
sensory) vocabulary . Thus, when physicists infer the existence of elementary parti-
cles and subatomic forces from ordinary macroscopic data, or even when a jury 
fi nds a defendant guilty on the basis of the evidence presented in a trial, they are 
often not merely making some sort of statistical generalization about that data, but 
leaping to the activation of what seem to be concepts such as [quark] or [corporate 
conspiracy] that manifestly involve commitments that go far beyond the concepts 
being deployed in characterizing the evidence. 
 In view of these issues about confi rmation, it is unlikely that concepts in general 
could be defi ned in terms of the evidence adduced for them, and insofar as ordinary 
concepts are deployed to explain regularities in experience, it has seemed similarly 
unlikely to many philosophers that those concepts could be defi ned in terms of that 
experience. 
 There have been a number of responses to these problems with the Classical 
View, internalist and externalist. The internalist ones, to be discussed in the next 
three subsections, simply alter the Classical methods of internal mental “construc-
tion” of concepts and so continue to support Empiricism. It is because Fodor is 
equally sceptical of these further methods that he follows a number of philosophers 
in advocating an Externalist theory, to which we will in turn in Section 3.4, and 
which we will see affords a basis for his extreme Rationalism. 
 21 A verifi cationist could go on to insist, as  Quine ( 1960 ,  1969 ) is standardly read, that 
meaning would be similarly holistic (“meaning holism”). But, as  Fodor and Lepore ( 1992 ) point 
out, this threatens to undermine the  stability of concepts, given that no two people (or different 
stages of one person over time) are likely to share anything like the  totality of their beliefs (only 
“threatens,” since meaning holism—although perhaps not verifi cationism—can be defended in a 
variety of ways against this worry; see  Greenberg and Harman ( 2006 ) and  Pagin ( 2006 )). 
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 3.3.3. Prototype Theories 
 “Prototype” theories are sometimes taken to be a kind of definition theory 
(e.g., something is an F to the degree that it resembles a prototype), but more usu-
ally as a rejection of the demand for strict defi nitions, replacing them with descrip-
tions of typical instances, or traits shared by typical instances.  Rosch ( 1973 ) and 
 Smith and Medin ( 1981 /1999) showed that people respond differently (in terms of 
response time and other measures) to questions about whether, for example, pen-
guins as opposed to robins are birds, in a fashion that suggests that concept mem-
bership is a matter not of possessing a Classical analysis, but of distance from 
a prototype or typical exemplars, robins being thereby better birds than are 
penguins. 
 Prototypes are clearly music to an Empiricist’s ears, since constructing a proto-
type is an activity very much rooted in one’s experience, and the character of the 
examples of a concept that one happens to have encountered. In her response to 
(RCN),  Cowie ( 1999 , 146–47) proposes that concepts do have, at least partly, a pro-
totypical structure, and that it is this aspect of a concept that is learned from experi-
ence (see also  Prinz ( 2002 ) on “proxytypes”). 
 A number of objections have been raised against prototype theories of 
concepts:
 (i) Not all concepts have prototypes (consider [carburetor] or [not a cat]), 
and, even in the case of those that do, it just does not seem plausible to 
insist that a competent user of a concept be acquainted with one, much 
less the  same one for everyone: Spaniards and Australians may have 
different prototypes of [bird] but nonetheless share the concept; 
 (ii) Many concepts cannot be identifi ed with prototypes, since competent 
users of a concept know full well there can be perfectly good instances of 
a concept (e.g. [bird]) that are not prototypical (e.g., penguins), and, 
moreover, that something could satisfy the prototype (feathered, chirps) 
without being an instance (e.g., fancy toys); 
 (iii) In order for prototypes to fi gure effectively as an account of concepts, 
some “distance” metric among them would need to be specifi ed (how 
unlike a typical bird can something be and still be a bird?), and it is not 
clear how this is provided without an independent characterization of 
the concept; 
 (iv) Prototypes are not  compositional : (knowing) the prototype of [pet] (e.g., 
a dog) and the prototype of [fi sh] (e.g., a trout) does not determine 
(knowing) the prototype of [pet fi sh], and someone might know the 
prototype of [pet fi sh] without knowing the prototypes of [pet] or [fi sh] 
(see  Fodor  1998 ). 
 Prototypes arguably play a role in how people quickly  tell whether something satis-
fi es a concept, that is, they provide good  evidence for its application, and may fi gure 
centrally in a person’s  conception of its extension, but, as we saw in rejecting 
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 verifi cationism, evidence and conceptions are one thing, conceptual content quite 
another (see  Rey  1983 /1999, 1986; and  Fodor  1998 ,  2001 for further discussion). 
 3.3.4. Non-Sensory Primitives 
 There is no intrinsic reason for either the Classical or maybe even Prototype views 
to be committed to either a sensory or other verifi cationist theory of concept con-
struction, and there have been both philosophers and cognitive scientists who have 
thought that certain very general concepts, such as [agent], [object], [property], 
[number], [cause]—sometimes called “framework concepts”—might be primitive 
and innate, and provide a better basis than mere sensory experience for conceptual 
construction (see  Miller and Johnson-Laird  1976 ;  Moravcsik  1975 ;  Pustejovsky  1995 ; 
 Jackendoff  1983 ,  1992 ;  Pinker  2007 , ch. 3, for numerous proposals along these lines, 
and  Fodor  1998 , chs. 3–4 for criticisms). 
 A problem for this approach is to specify the relevant framework concepts and, 
more importantly, provide an account of what (constitutively) determines their 
content. Proponents will maintain that this is settled simply by whatever primitives 
their successful explanatory programs posit, but it is not clear how those programs 
as they are currently pursued will suffi ce.  Fodor ( 1998 , 49ff) complains that in order 
for such explanations to go through, the framework concepts must be understood 
univocally, and this univocality needs to be established. It is not enough merely to 
appeal to homophonic English words. Thus, Fodor argues, Jackendoff ’s (1992, 
37–39) example of [keep] seems on the face of it either ambiguous or polysemous in 
“keeping a bird,” “keeping time,” “keeping a crowd happy,” and “keeping an ap-
pointment.” Perhaps it is, if [keep] can be analyzed into some complex such as 
[cause a state that endures over time]—that is, if [keep] is not a framework concept 
after all. But now we have to ask the same question about  its constituents: is [cause] 
or [endure] univocal? Does an appointment  endure in the same sense as money 
does? Are they both  caused in the same sense? What sense is that? 
 A related general problem with any approach that looks to analyses of any sort 
is to provide a basis for claiming that some proposed construction really is the  cor-
rect account or “analysis” of a concept, as opposed to simply some banal or deeply 
entrenched belief about the world. Is it part of the concept [cat] that cats are ani-
mals? Or is this merely a belief that everyone takes for granted? Would thinking that 
cats are robots controlled from Mars be as incoherent as thinking that there are cats 
that are not cats? This is a form of the challenge already mentioned that  Quine 
( 1953 ,  1956 ) raised against the analytic/synthetic distinction, to which no generally 
accepted reply has yet been made (see  Putnam,  1962a /1975;  Katz  1990 , 216ff; but also 
 Horwich  1998 ,  2005 ; and  Rey  2009 , for recent proposals to meet this challenge that 
are related to Fodor’s own proposals). 
 3.3.5. Other Methods of Defi nition 
 It is notable that many of Fodor’s (1981) examples of constructions are  Boolean 
(composed of simple truth functions such as [and] and [or]). But there is no reason 
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to suppose that mental constructions might not be more sophisticated, employing 
complex quantifi cations and modal and probability operators. For example, con-
cepts such as [energy], [mass], [force], and [space] are likely best defi ned  together by 
setting out the complex laws of physics in which they all occur, and adding “and 
that’s all there is to being any one of these things.” A raft of concepts is thereby in-
troduced in terms of the roles they play together in explaining some domain. The 
philosopher Frank  Ramsey ( 1929 ) developed a technical proposal, now called “ram-
sifi cation,” that allows this to be done with a great deal of precision (roughly, a 
“Ramsey sentence” says that there does indeed exist a number of things, say, energy, 
mass, etc. that satisfy the terms that a theory introduces with the conjunction of all 
its claims; each of the individual terms can then be defi ned by its role with the 
others in that long conjunction; see David  Lewis ( 1972 /1980) for a lucid exposition). 
Such clauses in a theory might serve for what  Carnap ( 1952 ) called “meaning postu-
lates,” or principles that are set out as defi ning of the terms being introduced by 
them ( Murphy and Medin,  1985 /1999;  Block  1986 ). This would seem to be in part 
what Susan  Carey ( 2009 , chs. 8 and 11) has in mind in defending a “bootstrapping” 
proposal she fi nds in  Quine ( 1960 ,  1969 ) and other philosophers of science. Accord-
ing to her proposal, “place holder” symbols are generated by assimilating a lot of 
information about a domain in the form of diagrams, lists, stray claims, and some-
times some serious theory: one could think of all this material as being expressed by 
one long Ramsey sentence that conjoins all of it, and allows one to refer to the single 
phenomenon (if any) in the world that satisfi es it. The gradual assimilation of this 
material permits a learner to gradually master new concepts by slowly grasping par-
tially now one conjunct and now another until they all fi t together to characterize a 
stable concept. 
 One prima facie problem with this approach, however, is still the above Quin-
ean one of deciding which clauses in a theory are to be included as meaning consti-
tutive, and which as merely empirical claims about the world. Moreover, people are 
constantly creating and revising new theories involving old concepts, without ipso 
facto changing the content of those concepts. When Darwin proposed that humans 
are a kind of primate, he may have changed the prevailing  conception (i.e., common 
beliefs) about human beings, but he did not thereby change the  content of the con-
cept. Indeed, it was precisely because he was employing a concept, [human], with 
the very same content as creationists that the latter were so upset! 
 More modestly, however, ramsifi cations might serve as “reference fi xers,” or de-
scriptions that  in a particular context serve to fi x the reference of a term without 
being synonymous with it (see  Jackson,  1998 ). This idea has its origins in Kripke’s 
(1972/1980) discussion of proper names, where he points out that the descriptions 
people commonly associate with a proper name (e.g., “the discoverer of America” 
with “Columbus,” “the author of  Moby Dick ” with “Melville”) are certainly not syn-
onymous with the name, and, indeed, could turn out to be false of its referent. He 
argued that proper names and many natural kind terms are “rigid designators” that 
name the same thing in all possible worlds, including those in which the common 
descriptions are not necessarily true (for example, it was perfectly possible for 
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 Columbus not to discover America): the common descriptions serve merely to “fi x 
the reference” of a term in a particular context, and not as defi nitions (an idea to 
which we will return below in considering Laurence and Margolis’s (2002) “kind 
syndromes”). 
 Kripke’s proposal caused a minor revolution in philosophy, for it reinforced a 
suspicion that had been sown by Quine’s attack on the analytic that  no internal, 
 epistemic condition would suffi ce for a theory of meaning. So, again, the Classical 
empiricist view of concept acquisition seemed implausible. Rather, meaning must 
in the fi rst instance essentially involve some sort of relation to phenomena  external 
to the mind and brain of a thinker. 
 3.4. Externalism 
 3.4.1. Causal Theories 
 Kripke’s idea that reference is constituted at least in part by external facts was al-
ready suggested by some of the views of the later  Wittgenstein ( 1953 ), and was inde-
pendently proposed by Hilary Putnam (1975). Tyler  Burge ( 1979 ) applied it not only 
to the meanings of both natural (“water”) and artifactual (“sofa”) kind terms, but 
also to their corresponding concepts. They pointed out that such terms and con-
cepts do not standardly involve defi nitions known to their users, but rather (causal) 
relations with their actual referents and/or the social community in which they are 
used. 
 Now, of course, if possessing a concept  did depend upon having a certain his-
torical connection to an environment, certainly a certain facile form of empiricism 
would be vindicated: what concepts one had would depend directly upon what 
world one had experienced. However, while these causal intuitions provide an inter-
esting challenge to the Classical View, they are quite inadequate as a theory of con-
ceptual competence. Mere causal interaction in a certain community and 
environment cannot be enough, since surely not  all sentient beings in New York 
have the concepts of a Columbia University physicist they have bumped into on the 
subway! But if mere causation is not enough, and defi nitions are not available, what 
does determine whether someone has a specifi c concept? 
 A number of writers have proposed varieties of  counterfactual causal links: x 
has the concept [y] iff some state of x did/would causally co-vary with the worldly 
phenomenon y; for example, x did/would  discriminate instances of y under certain 
(ideal, normal, evolutionarily signifi cant) conditions, as a matter of nomological 
necessity. Thus, someone has the concept [horse] iff she could under certain condi-
tions tell the horses from the non-horses. This is the idea behind “informational” 
(or “co-variational”) theories of the sort proposed by  Dretske ( 1980 ,  1987 ), and  Stal-
naker ( 1984 ).  Fodor ( 1991 ,  1998 ) developed the most sophisticated of these accounts 
with his “asymmetric dependency” analysis, whereby a symbol x means that p iff its 
application to non-p cases depends on its application to p cases, but not vice versa 
(thus, one calls a misperceived cat “a dog” only because one calls a dog “a dog,” but 
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one does not call a dog “a dog” because one calls a cat one). In such cases,  Fodor 
( 1998 ) talks of symbols “locking” onto their referents. (Notice that if the causal con-
nection between a concept and its meaning-constitutive referent were  counterfac-
tual , then the above facile argument for empiricism would no longer be available: 
the causal relation would not depend upon  actual history, much less experience.) 
 There are numerous problems with informational theories. Once one departs 
from the relatively straightforward cases of perceptual concepts that even empiri-
cists would be happy to regard as primitive, it is by no means obvious that there 
really are the kinds of genuine laws linking the brain symbols to worldly phenom-
ena in a way that would provide those symbols with their conceptual content (what 
are the laws for [cause]? [object]? [space]?, or for logical concepts such as [not] or 
[if]?) (see  Loewer  1996 ). Particularly troublesome cases are “empty” concepts, such 
as [ghost], [angel], [soul], and (at least for some) [triangle] and [square], for which 
there are arguably no  possible worldly phenomena with which brain symbols could 
co-vary. 22  Fodor ( 1998 ) crucially claims “there can be no  primitive concept without 
a corresponding property for it to lock to” (165), but then it would appear that he 
would have to allow such empty concepts to be “constructed” after all. But, if them, 
why not others? 23 
 These and other considerations have led a number of philosophers and psy-
chologists to embrace “two factor” theories that claim that conceptual content is 
determined by  both causal relations to the world  and internal computational roles 
(see  Block  1986 ;  Carey  2009 , 514ff). For example, the content of [bird] may consist 
both of a role component that fi gures in accounts of internal psychological 
 processing—for example, common conceptions and prototypes associated with 
birds— and an external causal component that determines what phenomena in the 
world is picked out. However, many of the problems we mentioned with respect to 
these components considered separately would appear to persist in their combina-
tion: it seems possible for prototypes and conceptions to vary across people without 
variation in their concepts, and it is not clear how internal factors can fi gure in a 
compositional semantics. 
 In his (1998), Fodor proposes an interesting intermediate view that, while not 
treating prototypes as  constitutive of concepts, treats them as playing a crucial role 
in the  triggering of them. 
 3.4.2. Fodor’s (1998) Prototype Triggering View 
 Fodor ( 1998 , 127ff) considers an important problem for his view that concepts are 
triggered and not learned, what he calls the “doorknob/DOORKNOB” problem: 
why is it that [doorknob] is regularly triggered by doorknobs, and not, say, by 
 22 Such cases motivate an appeal to Fregean senses, cf. fn 12. 
 23 One might reply here that in the case of empty terms, such as “elf,” “phlogiston.” or 
“Vulcan,” there is, indeed, nowhere to retreat but to the claims by which they are introduced, but 
that in the cases where terms  do succeed in referring, the introductory material gets trumped by 
the referent, so that, e.g., “water” or “polio” is no longer tied to it (see  Rey  2005 for discussion). 
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 giraffes or French fl ags (see also  Sterelny,  1989 )? The fact that it is suggests that a 
concept perhaps is not merely “triggered” as a brute causal process, but, in Des-
cartes’s phrase, is “occasioned” by virtue of some kind of rational, confi rmatory 
relation between a concept and perceptual stimuli, and so might involve a kind of 
learning after all. 
 To solve this problem, Fodor adopts a quasi-Kantian metaphysics of the very 
items so picked out. He exploits the prototype views we mentioned earlier,  not 
toward making some point about the content of  concepts , but instead about the 
metaphysics of, for example,  doorknobs ! The reason doorknobs occasion activation 
of the [doorknob] concept is that  doorknobs just are the kind of thing to which 
humans generalize when presented with prototypical doorknobs . That is, he treats such 
cases on the model of the “response-dependent” properties that many philosophers 
have proposed for secondary properties such as color. (Unlike Kant, however, Fodor 
does not claim that  all concepts are of response-dependent properties; in the next 
section we will return to the “scientifi c” ones that are not.) Whether such a story can 
really be told generally in conjunction with an informational theory of content 
without circularity remains controversial (the proposal skirts perilously close to the 
claim that possessing the concept of doorknob requires a representation being 
locked onto—well, just those things to which the representation is locked! See 
 Cowie  1999 , 96–99). However,  Fodor ( 1998 , 138) argues that circularity is avoided by 
the fact that at least many prototypes are known to be specifi able independently of 
the concepts they occasion (as in  Rosch  1973 ). 
 Whether or not his view avoids circularity, Fodor sees it as permitting him to 
retreat from his initial (1975, 1981) controversial view that all MM  concepts are innate. 
His 1975 argument too quickly assumed that if a concept was not learned, it was 
innate. Recalling the distinction between rational and brute-causal effects of per-
ceptual experience, on the present view concepts can be  acquired from experience 
by a nonrational triggering mechanism without being learned, and so need not be 
either learned  or innate. As he puts it in his still later 2008 book:
 You can’t infer from a concept’s not being learned to its being innate; not, at least, 
if “innate” means something like “not acquired in consequence of experience.” 
There would appear to be plenty of ethological precedents—from “imprinting” to 
“parameter setting” [in Chomskyan linguistic theories] inclusive—where it’s im-
plausible that the acquisition of a concept is mediated by a rational process like 
inductive inference, but where concept acquisition is nevertheless highly sensitive 
to the character of the creature’s experience. (2008, 144–45) 
 This leads him to refi ne his 1975 position:
 What’s learned (not just acquired) are stereotypes (statistical representations of 
experience). What’s innate is the disposition to grasp such and such a concept 
(i.e., to lock to such and such a property) in consequence of having learned such 
and such a stereotype. (2008, 162) 
 Indeed: “the kind of nativism about [doorknob] that an informational atomist has 
to put up with is perhaps not one of concepts but of  mechanisms ” (1998, 142), the 
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processes of which he takes to be nonrational and even nonintentional. They are 
simply “brute causal,” not psychological processes. 24 
 Slightly revising the distinctions we drew earlier between activation, lying in 
wait, and expressive power, we might put Fodor’s (1998) view as follows: concepts 
themselves are not innate and do not lie in wait, unactivated. What is innate are 
highly specifi c dispositional mechanisms to acquire a concept upon exposure to the 
concept’s prototype. These  mechanisms lie in wait in a creature’s brain, and the 
actual acquisition of a concept consists in a mental representation being produced 
by the activation of the mechanism, and coming to stand in a certain counterfactu-
ally specifi ed locking relation to the real world phenomenon that constitutes its 
content. The notion of a conceptual system’s  expressive power is expanded from 
merely concepts activated or lying in wait to the range of concepts these innate 
mechanisms can produce in this way, and by logical combination. Fodor’s main 
claim remains that expressive power in this sense is not increased by learning. The 
relation of a prototype to the concept it activates through these mechanisms is brute 
causal. 
 Incidentally, Fodor was not the fi rst to despair of an intentional solution to re-
lating percepts to concepts. In his  Critique of Pure Reason ,  Kant ( 1787 /1934, A138ff) 
postulated his “schemata” to mediate between the two, 25 and resignedly claimed 
that
 the schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their 
mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes 
of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover. ( Kant,  1787 /1934, A141) 
 For  Fodor ( 1998 ,  2008 ), it is stereotypes that play the role of Kant’s schemata, trig-
gering innate dispositions to lock onto a property. But, as we saw above (Section 
3.3.3), they do not exhaust a typical concept that has commitments far beyond them. 
So there is still the question why a specifi c stereotype triggers one concept rather 
than another, for example, [green] rather than [grue]. This is what  Fodor ( 2008 ) 
thinks is determined by just brute causation. 
 Note that,  pace  Cowie ( 1999 , 72), Fodor’s despair here does not imply any “non-
naturalism” on his part. Fodor’s view is not that there is no  natural explanation of 
acquisition; there is just no  intentional one. Explanation of  most of nature is not in-
tentional. Why should it be surprising if concept acquisition turns out not to be so? 
 24 This emphasis on whether the processes are brute causal or psychological recalls Samuels’s 
conception of innateness (Section 2.2). But, of course, on that conception the concepts would 
therefore be innate as well, which Fodor here is allowing that they “perhaps” are not. (Cf. fn. 11.) It 
is unclear what of importance would be lost if Fodor embraced Samuels’s view and continued to 
claim that concepts are innate as well. 
 25 Unlike Fodor, Kant was here mainly concerned only with what he called “pure” concepts, 
such as [object] and [cause], and not with how to acquire a concept from experience, but how to 
apply one to it. And, of course, Kant’s project is to determine transcendentally what is constitutive 
of experience, not to provide a naturalistic account of it. But the similarity in problems is striking. 
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 Still, one might fi nd such a view puzzling and unsatisfying: there remain those 
250,000-plus  specifi c  dispositions to acquire concepts by specifi cally linked stereo-
types, and this might seem even more profl igate than merely 250,000-plus concepts 
by themselves. And so one might well want to continue to investigate further ways 
concepts could be constructed from experience without merely triggering specifi c 
innate dispositions.  Fodor ( 2008 ) deals with this response. 
 3.5. Fodor’s (2008) View 
 In his most recent discussion of the issues,  Fodor ( 2008 ) provides a further argu-
ment against concept learning to those already noted above, one based simply on 
the familiar problem of distinct coextensional concepts, for example [morning 
star]/[evening star], [renate/cordate], [triangle]/[trilateral] (cf.  Frege  1892 /1966). 
How, Fodor wonders, can experience by itself provide a basis for learning the one 
concept and not the other? Only, he replies, by “representing the experience in dif-
ferent ways” (2008, 133–35), which again requires that one already has the very con-
cept that experience has been recruited to teach. 
 Moreover, he scorns his earlier views as being “too modest” with regard to com-
plex representations:
 What I should have said is that it’s true and  a priori that the whole notion of con-
cept learning is per se confused . . .  no concept can be learned, primitive or com-
plex. (2008, 130 and 138) 
 Certainly, continuing the line of his (1975), construction of complex representations 
is not a way of acquiring an  expressive  capacity that one’s nervous system did not 
already possess (we will return shortly to weaker, mere activation notions of con-
cept possession, with which he may have been confusing expressive capacity in his 
(1975)). 
 Fodor ( 2008 ) also replies to some plausible proposals advanced by  Margolis 
( 1998 ) and  Laurence and Margolis ( 2002 ), who argue that many ordinary natural 
kind concepts are acquired by children rather in the way that  Fodor ( 1998 ) reserves 
for “scientifi c” ones. As we mentioned in the last section, in his (1998, 150–62) Fodor, 
unlike Kant, does allow that not all concepts are of mind-dependent phenomena. In 
particular, he allows that natural kind concepts, for example, [water], [gold], apply 
to things in the world that, unlike doorknobs, enter into laws, independently of 
what humans generalize to. Fodor claims, however, that these are “a late and sophis-
ticated achievement,” attained only “in the context of the scientifi c enterprise” (1998, 
159). Although children and other proto-scientifi c people do in fact have such con-
cepts, Fodor does not think they play a scientifi c role in their thought—they are for 
such people concepts of natural kinds but are not yet treated by them  as natural 
kind concepts. 
 It is hard to see, however, why the intellectual attitudes (if not all the skills) of 
scientists are not  sometimes available to nonscientists. In the work mentioned ear-
lier on proper names and natural kind terms,  Kripke ( 1972 /1980) and Putnam (1975) 
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drew attention to what would seem to be a property of much of the  ordinary use of 
natural kind terms, such as “water” and “gold,” whereby people are prepared to take 
such terms to refer to things with a “hidden essence” precisely along the lines Fodor 
reserves for scientists. Lest one suppose that perhaps Kripke and Putnam are secur-
ing agreement about these terms only from scientifi cally minded philosophers, it is 
worth noting that a number of cognitive scientists have produced evidence of simi-
lar intuitions in children and non-Westerners (see  Macnamara  1986 ;  Keil  1989 ; 
 Medin and Atran  1999 ;  Gelman  2003 ). 26 
 In relation to concepts,  Laurence and Margolis ( 2002 , 38) develop a suggestion 
of Putnam (1975) and propose a quite general function (they call it a “kind syn-
drome . . . a collection of properties that is highly indicative of a kind yet is accessible 
in perceptual encounters. . . . [e.g.,] typical shape, motions, markings, sounds, colors, 
etc.”) that, in conjunction with the essentialist attitude, takes an eliciting descrip-
tion to the nearest, contextually natural or explanatory kind that includes the mate-
rial in the syndrome. Thus, [water] might be constructed as the nearest natural kind 
that includes the odorless, tasteless stuff that we drink, is found in streams and 
ponds, and is the stuff of rain. One might well extend this move beyond merely 
natural kind concepts to whatever is the “best account” of the reference of a term: 
thus, a nonnatural kind concept, [viol], might be constructed as the nearest kind 
that plays an explanatory role in the history of the modern violin (see  Rey  1983 ). 
 Carey ( 2009 , 519) tries to generalize this account with her above-mentioned boot-
strapping proposal, which she argues is not restricted to or dependent upon an 
antecedent notion of natural kind. Although such a kind syndrome is not  constitu-
tive of the concepts of, say, [water] or [viol], plausibly the only way someone could 
lock on to the corresponding properties is by knowing such clauses. It is, as  Margo-
lis ( 1998 ) puts it, a “sustaining mechanism” that explains the locking and keeps it in 
place. So, why not suppose that learning those clauses provides an account of ordi-
nary folk  learning a concept, even if it is not defi ning of it? 
 Fodor ( 2008 , 144) notes in reply that “‘You can learn (and not merely acquire) 
A’ and ‘Learning A is suffi cient for acquiring B’ just doesn’t imply ‘You can learn B.’” 
Again, B may merely be  triggered by the learning of A. Remember, as we noted in 
 26 Recently,  Machery et al. ( 2004 ) have found evidence of intuitions purportedly contrary 
to those of Kripke and Putnam among some non-Western peoples. Such fi ndings tend, however, 
to be beside the point, since what is at issue is not whether  all uses of such terms are  always 
to a hidden essence, but only that a signifi cant class are so for at least some people other than 
scientifi cally minded philosophers, which this research in fact confi rms: many of the non-
Westerners shared the Kripke/Putnam intuitions. For further criticisms, see  Devitt ( 2011 ). 
 Fodor (1998, 154–55) argues that the evidence that children have natural kind concepts as 
such is all interpretable merely as evidence that they make an appearance/reality distinction: the 
evidence of which he is aware does not establish that they think of a hidden essence as being the 
 cause of appearances. This latter presumption is questionable: it is not at all clear that hidden 
essences must be (believed to be) causal in this way; many appearances, (e.g., the color of the sea) 
might be (believed to be) due entirely to factors other than water being H20. But in any case, in 
reply to Fodor, Gelman (2003, ch. 5, esp. 135) provides just such evidence of causal thinking. 
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discussing abduction, the concepts we deploy in experience often involve commit-
ments far beyond the evidence they explain, and so the question is just what takes 
us from the evidence to  these and  not other further commitments. 27 
 A way to bring out the gap that Fodor is positing between the kind syndrome 
and conceptual locking is to consider the problem of saying just what the “nearest” 
kind is: point to a cat and you point  inter alia to, say, its ear, a  fl ea on its ear, to a 
 domestic cat , to a  feline, to a  mammal , and so on. It is here that Goodman’s “grue” 
problem we discussed in Section 3.2 returns with a vengeance. There are an infi nite 
number of possible concepts that are compatible with any fi nite set of data a crea-
ture will have encountered: not merely an infi nitude of grue predicates, in which 
“observed before  t ” is incremented by one year, but an infi nitude of other analogous 
combinations, for example, [gred], [grellow], [catiraffe] (a cat and observed before 
 t or otherwise a giraffe), etc. (Note that we cannot rely on human beings always re-
ferring to genuine natural kinds: consider [race], [humors], [earth], [air], [angel], 
even [red] and [green] themselves, which depend on idiosyncracies of our visual 
system.)  Devitt and Sterelny ( 1987 /1999) call this general problem the “ qua prob-
lem”:  qua , or as,  what do you refer when you point to the cat? Spelling out “nearest 
natural kind”—perhaps in terms of contextually relevant contrasts—would be a 
diffi cult, but perhaps not entirely hopeless research program. Fodor, though, is not 
holding his breath. He thinks the answer lies not in some rational connection be-
tween the relevant concept and the stimuli (even in the context), but in a brute-
causal fact by which the concept is simply perceptually triggered by these stimuli. 
 4.  Conclusion   
 Proposals such as Laurence and Margolis’s (2002) proposal seem to come as close as 
one can to capturing the pre-theoretic notion of “learning a concept.”According to 
them, at least with natural kind concepts, new primitive concepts can be acquired 
by learning, because there can be cases where one’s experience “initiates a process 
where information is collected, stored, and manipulated in a way that controls a 
representation so that it tracks” what it is in fact about (2002, 43). On their view, 
because such concepts are learned, they are not innate. Fodor, on the other hand, 
would insist that only the  collected information is learned, denying that the concept 
associated with it is therefore learned. The disagreement here can be seen as one 
concerning whether brute perceptual triggering is required in addition to the 
 27 An interesting possibility raised by Fodor’s view here is that someone might create a Ramsey 
sentence that  does not trigger an innate (disposition to acquire a) concept. Perhaps this is the 
situation we fi nd ourselves in with respect to, for example, the phenomenon of  light as described in 
modern physics, which behaves both like a wave  and like a stream of particles, while it is diffi cult for 
(most of) us to conceive how something could do both. 
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 rationally assimilated information, but also in part as one concerning what should 
count as “learning,” or at least learning a concept: can  it include mere brute trigger-
ing by collected rationally relevant information or not? 
 Put aside the pre-theoretic notion of learning, as well as Fodor’s last proposal to 
retreat merely to dispositions to acquire concepts upon exposure to prototypes. Re-
membering the distinctions we originally drew in Section 3.2 between  expressive 
power, lying in wait , and  actual activation , a boringly (or maybe radically) ecumeni-
cal view suggests itself. Some concepts could be  both innate and learned at least in 
the following sense: concepts would be  innate insofar as they cannot be constructed 
from or defi ned in terms of experience, but  learned insofar as they are activated in 
an effort to confi rm their application ultimately on the basis of experience. 28 
 What is given at birth, or as a consequence of brute non-intentional infl uences 
on the brain, is a system with a certain expressive power: a set of primitives that have 
their content by virtue of their causal relations to the world, and principles of logi-
cal combination that permit the construction of an indefi nite variety of logically 
complex representations out of them. These primitives and their logical combina-
tions determine what the creature can  possibly think, and this, if Fodor is right, can 
never be increased by any rational process. 29 
 However, that the  activation or  deployment of a concept can often depend upon 
learning about the world, laboriously constructing stereotypes or Ramsey sentences 
that are designed to pick out the nearest explanatory kinds that offer, via abduction, 
the best explanation of relevant phenomena. The process could proceed much along 
the lines of a “hypothetical deductive” (HD) model of explanation, according to 
which explanation consists in deducing descriptions of the target phenomena from 
general hypotheses that are thereby confi rmed (see  Hempel  1965 ). Such a process is 
not the less confi rmatory should the hypotheses, or their constituent concepts 
themselves, not have their  source in experience, or not be reducible to it. (Of course, 
not all activation is by learning: some may be brute, and some may, as  Hume 
( 1734 /1978, 10) emphasized, be merely imaginative—and here, indeed, one wonders 
what the source of imagined concepts could be other than the native repertoire, if 
they are neither triggered nor constructed from experience.) 
 There are, of course, constraints on how easily people actually can perform the 
logical constructions. To invoke a nice distinction from  Chomsky ( 1965 ), there may 
be “performance” issues (e.g., short-term memory resources, motivation) con-
straining the activation of an underlying conceptual “competence.” It is relatively 
easy to construct [viol] and [prime number]; much harder, [curved space-time]. 
The diffi culties may even fall into patterns: construction of representations of 
 28 The data to be explained in learning a concept in this way need not be evidence about 
whether a concept actually  applies to the world . Often we come to grasp concepts by explaining 
merely the remarks of another speaker, as when we understand the concepts, say, [karma] or 
[phlogiston], of some theory we presume to be false. 
 29 Note that this ecumenical view could be adapted also to the expanded notion of expressive 
power introduced in Section 3.4.2. 
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 abstract concepts beyond perceptual appearances seems to require sometimes enor-
mous effort (as in the case of the physics concepts of  heat and  entropy ); and perhaps 
the diffi culties are subject to developmental stages of the sort suggested by  Piaget 
( 1954 ,  1980 ). Indeed, even if concepts themselves (and not merely the dispositions to 
acquire them) were innate, Piaget could be right about childhood inabilities, say, to 
think about rational numbers. A neonate may well have a system capable of express-
ing every concept she will ever learn, but simply lack the further memory capacities 
or motivation to activate them. 
 The idea that one and the same trait could be both innate and learned might 
seem counterintuitive, if not downright paradoxical (cf. fn. 2). But it will perhaps 
seem less so when one considers the grounds for thinking of concepts in this way. 
The suggestion is that it is the full repertoire of concepts that is innate, with learning 
serving to select from the set of concepts those that are suitable for explaining the 
relevant data of experience. On this view, we thus must distinguish two levels of 
possession: concepts are innately had, but can also be had in a further, activated 
sense as a result of learning. Learning a concept thus turns out to be a kind of acqui-
sition that involves an innate component—the concept itself—just as, if Jerne is 
right, acquiring certain immunities involves being exposed to certain pathogens 
that activate innate antibodies. Our ordinary, intuitive notion of innateness would 
simply turn out to pick out a phenomenon that is more intricate that it initially ap-
pears to be. 
 Just how much this conception of learning ought to satisfy conceptual empiri-
cists depends upon both the degree to which concept activation  does involve some-
thing such as an HD model of explanation of purely sensory material and the degree 
to which the HD model is an adequate model of learning. Neither of these questions 
can remotely be regarded as settled. If the locking of a representation onto an exter-
nal content were caused merely by some purely “accidental” reference fi xer—for 
example, a child who happens to lock onto quarks as a result of learning the de-
scription “what father wrote his book about” and using it to explain his father’s 
scholarly behavior—it would seem pretty far from counting as  learning . 30 But is 
locking as a result of mastering some facts in a textbook in principle any different? 
Even if they are not defi nitions, some stereotypes, reference fi xers, and Ramsey sen-
tences seem more “rationally connected” than others to the concepts they may trig-
ger, but it is not at all clear how to specify just what that rational connection might 
be. Indeed, what  constrains the further commitments a concept involves beyond the 
evidence that triggered it? Why is it—if it is—more rational for a child to jump to 
the concept [green] and not [grue] in encountering grass and pistachio nuts? 
 Conceptual nativism thus turns on a number of issues that may not have been 
evident at the outset:
 30 Consider a child who might be genetically incapable of understanding quantum physics: 
on some views, he might be said to think “his father works on quarks” simply by virtue of 
“reference borrowing” among members of a language group (cf.  Kripke,  1972 /80), but without his 
actually having  learned the concept. 
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 (i) whether empiricists can succeed in providing successful  analyses of some 
signifi cant portion of MM concepts from some set of primitives, despite 
their persistent failures to do so (see Section 3); 
 (ii) whether some sort of externalist, “informational” theory of content can 
be sustained on behalf of concepts lacking internalistic analyses (Section 
3.4.1); 
 (iii) whether and the degree to which concept acquisition involves an HD or 
other “rational” process (and whether that process counts as “learning”), 
or, instead, a brute-causal, nonrational mere “triggering” process, lost in 
the mysteries of neurophysiology (Section 3.5); 
 and
 (iv) whether there is any independent justifi cation for supposing some 
250,000-plus concepts, or specifi c dispositions to acquire them, are 
innate. 
 At this point, it would be foolhardy to suppose that any of these issues are anywhere 
near being settled. The possibilities of information theories of content and various 
means of concept construction have yet to be adequately explored, and, as we have 
emphasized, the psychological versus non-psychological processes of occasioning 
versus triggering a concept on which we have seen the question of the innateness of 
concepts seems to turn, have yet to be understood. 31 
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